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Abstract – This paper investigates the relationship between output-based incentives for service quality and the 
use of capital and non-capital resources to meet regulatory targets in the electricity industry. To conduct the 
empirical analysis we use a dataset collected with the support of the Italian energy regulatory authority, 
comprising micro data on monetary incentives and physical assets for the largest electricity distribution operator 
in Italy (86% of the market).  Our results show that physical assets and operational expenditures do affect service 
quality. Moreover, when we investigate causality in the relationship between incentives to quality and the use of 
capital and non-capital resources, we find that incentives Granger-cause capital expenditures (and not vice-
versa). Finally, our results reveal an asymmetric effect of rewards and penalties on capital expenditures’ 
decisions across areas with different quality levels. From these findings, we derive several policy implications. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the introduction of structural reforms in energy network industries, a major concern of 
incentive regulation has been to encourage firms to focus on inputs - i.e. operational and 
capital expenditures- and to enhance productive efficiency and service quality. Only few 
directly measurable outputs were typically associated with an explicit definition of 
performance targets and with specific monetary incentives. In most cases, output-based 
incentives were employed to reduce network losses and/or to improve service quality (Jamasb 
and Pollit, 2007; Joskow, 2008). In Italy, the energy regulatory authority (Autorità per 
l’energia elettrica, il gas e il servizio idrico, AEEGSI) has been applying output-based 
regulation to indicators of service quality since 2000.  
In the past few years, energy regulators  have started to focus on additional goals, such as 
sustainability and innovation, and rely on output-based incentives that reward/penalize 
companies depending on their ability to reduce their environmental impact or to enable the 
integration of new technologies (e.g. dispersed generation or electrical vehicles), and so on. 
The Revenue, Innovation, Incentives and Output (RIIO) model, recently adopted in the UK 
(Ofgem, 2010), is probably the best-known example, but other European regulatory agencies 
are moving in this direction.1 In the US, where virtually all states have adopted ad-hoc 
regulatory incentives, specific output-based targets include energy efficiency and 
environmental sustainability.2 
This paper empirically investigates the relationship between output-based incentives for 
service quality and the use of capital and non-capital resources by the largest electricity 
distribution operator (86% of total distributed energy) in Italy. The primary aim of the paper 
is to understand whether rewards and penalties are both needed to spur such expenditures 
and, in turn, service quality, or if rewards (and penalties) simply push (and withdraw) money 
towards companies for their past superior (inferior) performance, without affecting their 
expenditure decisions. Our analysis can thus provide insights to national regulators on how 
incentive payments may be calibrated in order to prevent unnecessary transfers from 
consumers to firms (and vice versa). Output-based regulatory mechanisms are indeed 
complex to implement and require significant regulatory resources (powers, budget and 
skills) for data collection and monitoring, as well as periodical adjustments over time 
                                                 
1 As for Italy, see Lo Schiavo et al. (2013). 
2 For an overview of the regulatory regimes in the US electric utility industry on alternative output based goals 
in the US, see IEE (2013). 
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(Joskow, 2008; Jamasb et al. 2012). From a policy perspective, our analysis is therefore 
relevant in view of the direct regulatory costs of current and future regulatory frameworks. 
Among EU national regulators, the Italian Authority (AEEGSI) has been a frontrunner in 
the introduction of specific quality-based incentive schemes in electric distribution. To test 
the effect of output-based incentives, we use micro data on electricity distribution, collected 
with the support of the AEEGSI through a dedicated survey on the activity of the largest 
distributor in Italy, Enel Distribuzione, which operates throughout the national territory. The 
company is part of ENEL group, the former electricity state monopolist, privatized and 
publicly listed in 1999. Although the company is formally state-controlled, almost 75% is 
publicly traded (67% in 2009), so its behavior, including its responsiveness to regulatory and 
incentive policies is similar to that of privately controlled quoted firms.3 The dataset is a 
comprehensive and balanced panel of Enel Distribuzione’s 115 distribution Zones (or units), 
which includes unit-level accounting data from 2004 to 2009 and, more importantly for us, 
the amounts annually received as rewards (paid as penalties) for service quality – data that 
are generally available only to national regulatory agencies. The information on incentive 
(rewards and penalties) payments is a key feature of this paper, allowing us to investigate, 
differently from previous studies, if incentive payments affect the capital and non-capital 
expenditure decisions and whether this effect is asymmetric between rewards and penalties 
and differs among areas with different quality levels. 
Another distinctive feature in the case of Enel Distribuzione is the detail of the technical 
micro data, which allows us to measure the technical changes adopted by the company after 
the introduction of quality regulation in Italy (see, Cerretti et al., 2005 and Valtorta et al., 
2009). In general, it is difficult to identify quality-specific investments as many if not most 
technical and structural applications have multiple purposes. The fact that the company’s 
response to quality-specific incentives is (in part) measurable is a step forward with respect to 
the existing literature. In particular, AEEGSI has collected unit-level micro data on the type, 
location and timing of several technical interventions carried out by Enel Distribuzione over 
the territory it serves. Such detailed micro-level information is not available for any other 
jurisdiction served by alternative distributors in Italy and, to our knowledge, has not been 
exploited for similar analyses in other countries.  
                                                 
3 Notably, the ownership share held by the state through municipalities in the other Italian distributors is always 
larger than 50%, for example, A2A – Milan with 54%, ACEA - Rome with 51%, AEM (now IREN) – Genoa 
and Turin with 54%. 
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The recent economic literature has focused on the relationship between input-based 
incentive regulation (e.g. price/revenue caps), quality-specific incentives and the level of 
service quality. In a comprehensive survey, Sappington (2005) highlights that the 
introduction of minimum quality standards and/or rewards and penalties schemes is needed to 
secure a desirable level of service quality in presence of high-powered incentive mechanisms. 
Consistently, the empirical evidence shows that the introduction of quality standards  
prompts firms to achieve cost savings without adversely affecting quality (Reichl et al., 2008; 
Ter-Martisoryan and Kwoka, 2010).  
Differently from previous work that looked into the effect of the presence of quality 
regulation in the form of a dichotomous variable (Ter-Martisoryan and Kwoka, 2010), we 
employ here the annual monetary amounts actually assigned to (paid by) each distribution 
unit as a result of its quality performance, within an output-based mechanism. Our reasoning 
starts with the assumption that output-based incentives are expected to influence performance 
(with respect to the regulated output) by driving firms to invest in capital assets and/or 
additional operating expenses – ideally maintenance costs – in order to meet the regulatory 
target (Jamasb et al., 2012). In theory (Sappington, 2005; De Fraja and Iozzi, 2008), the 
firm’s decision to exert an effort is conditional on (marginal) incentives being larger (in 
absolute value) than firm’s (marginal) costs of (providing) quality. Given that incentives 
reflect consumer willingness to pay for quality, this mechanism should lead regulated firms 
to deliver welfare-maximizing levels of performance. In this paper, our purpose is to test the 
relationship between quality-related incentives and firm investment. 
Previous empirical work has related the level of regulatory incentives (per unit of quality 
improvement) with the estimated per unit cost of quality improvement (Jamasb et al., 2012; 
Coelli et al., 2013).  Finding that actual unitary incentives are higher (lower) than estimated 
per unit costs, the authors infer that firms are likely (not likely) to improve service quality.  
We differ from this approach in that we analyze the actual strategy of a large distribution 
firm. Specifically, we investigate whether incentives to quality affect the firm’s decision to 
invest in capital and operational expenditures in order to improve quality (a mechanism that 
may recall industrial policy interventions that offer tax incentives for R&D and innovation in 
manufacturing firms). Incentives are assigned at the end of the year, based on the observed 
performance. Therefore, it may happen that not only expected rewards/penalties incentives, 
but also rewards received or penalties paid at the end of the year positively affect future 
investments, in that they generate cash in-flows or out-flows that ultimately influence firm’s 
decisions.  
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Based on the regulatory setting in place in Italy, in the econometric analysis we account 
for this articulated timing of the incentive procedure and carry out the analysis proceeding 
along three steps.  
First, we provide empirical evidence that quality as measured by the average duration of 
service interruptions (i.e. the indicator of service quality that has been subject to regulatory 
control in Italy for the longest time) is affected by investments in physical assets and by 
operational expenses (an item that aggregates maintenance as well as operational costs). This 
result is in line with Ter-Martirosyan and Kwoka (2010), who show that, for the U.S., 
maintenance expenditures positively affect the same quality indicator. This first step serves 
the specific purpose to verify that, by increasing the available fixed assets and equipment 
and/or the aggregate operational expenditures, firms succeed in improving their quality 
performance. 
Second, we analyze the relationship between capital and operational expenditures and 
regulatory incentives. By employing the Granger (1969) and Sims (1972) causality test, we 
show that past incentives positively affect current capital expenditures, which suggests a 
causal relationship from output-based incentives to firm investment, but not vice versa.  In 
contrast, we find no evidence of a causal relationship between past incentives to quality and 
current operational expenses.  
Finally, we test whether the impact of output-based incentives on the investment rate 
survives after controlling for other determinants. To this end, we estimate a dynamic 
accelerator model of investment with financial effects, which includes lagged regulatory 
incentives among the explanatory variables. Furthermore, in order to investigate potential 
asymmetries between positive and negative incentives, we decouple rewards and penalties 
within the investment analysis. Our findings show that penalties (paid) play a significant role 
in the decision to invest, especially so if the unit’s quality performance is very low. Received 
rewards appear, instead, to affect the investment decision only in areas with top quality 
performance, but not in the remaining areas. Interestingly, therefore, neither rewards nor 
penalties seem to affect the investment decision in distribution units with average quality 
performance. Our results actually throw some light on the role of positive monetary 
incentives. Rewards do compensate the unit for having achieved a desirable level of 
performance – hence quality incentives are not assigned in vain -, but one should not 
necessarily expect that the same rewards unambiguously prompt the unit to further improve 
on it.  
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The  paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the relevant details of the Italian 
regulatory framework. Section 3 describes the research design and the empirical 
methodology. Section 4 illustrates the dataset and the variables used in the estimations. 
Section 5 presents the estimates from the regression analyses and discusses the results. 
Section 6 concludes and derives policy implications. 
 
2. Regulatory incentives in the Italian electricity distribution sector 
The structure of the Italian electricity distribution sector has been quite stable for the past ten 
years. At the end of 2013, it counted 136 Distribution System Operators (DSO) that delivered 
a total volume of 269 TWh. In 2009, the last year observed in this analysis, there were 140 
DSOs, which delivered 280 TWh. The largest firm and historical incumbent operator, Enel 
Distribuzione, was responsible for 86.2% of the distributed energy, followed by A2A Reti 
Elettriche (4.1%), Acea Distribuzione (3.6%) and Aem Torino Distribuzione (1.3%), serving 
the urban areas of Milan, Rome and Turin, respectively. Even today, none of the other 
operators delivers more than 1% of total distributed energy.  
Since 2000, the regulatory framework includes both input-based and output-based 
incentives: the former have the main objective to stimulate productive efficiency, the latter to 
ensure an adequate level of service quality. As for productive efficiency, a price cap 
mechanism applies to operational expenditures, requiring them to decrease annually by an X 
efficiency factor. Differently, depreciation and the cost of capital pass through directly to 
consumers. The cost of capital is remunerated with a fixed rate of return, estimated with a 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) methodology.4  
Service quality regulation encompasses several dimensions, ranging from commercial 
quality aspects (e.g., appointment scheduling) to highly specific technical characteristics 
(e.g., voltage dips). Different quality dimensions are controlled using different approaches 
(Fumagalli et al., 2007). Output-based incentives are specifically employed in Italy to 
regulate continuity of supply, i.e., the occurrence of service interruptions, with two main 
                                                 
4 For the second tariff period (2004-2007) WACC was set 6.8% and the X factor at 3.5%. For the third tariff 
period (2008-2011) the WACC was increased to 7% and the X factor was decreased to 1.9%. For the current, 
fourth tariff period (2012-2015) the WACC is set at 8.6% for the first two years and at 6.4% for the remaining 
two years; the X factor is set at 2.8%. Details on the choice of the WACC and X factors in the energy sector in 
Europe can be found in Cambini and Rondi (2010). Specific investment benefits have been introduced to 
support, for instance, the deployment of low-loss transformers and to promote automation and control of active 
grids (Lo Schiavo et al., 2013) 
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objectives: (i) to improve continuity levels and (ii) to reduce the differences in continuity 
levels observed across different geographical regions.  
To this end, AEEGSI requires DSOs to measure, on an annual basis, the average number 
and duration of service interruptions per customer. For a given distribution unit and year, the 
average duration of long interruptions (longer than 3 minutes) per consumer is indicated with 
the acronym SAIDI (System Average Interruption Duration Index) and calculated as: 
 
ܵܣܫܦܫ ൌ ෍ܦ௞ ௞ܰ
௧ܰ௢௧
ெ
௞ୀଵ
 
 
where the sum extends over all M interruptions in a year (k = 1…M) , Dk is the duration of 
interruption k (in minutes), Nk is the number of consumers affected by interruption k, and Ntot 
is the total number of consumers served in the distribution unit.5  
This indicator is measured, separately, in the 300 and more territorial districts that cover 
the entire national territory. Each district includes municipalities that are homogeneous in 
population density, that are located in the same administrative province and whose network is 
managed by the same distribution company.6 For each district, AEEGSI defines an annual 
target (more on this below) and requires companies to report, each year, the difference 
between the actual indicator and the target. Economic incentives (INCj,t) per district j and 
year t are calculated, as follows: 
 
ܫܰܥ௝,௧ ൌ ܦ݈݁ݐܽܵܣܫܦܫ௝,௧ ∙ ሺܥଵ ௥௘௦_௘௡௘௥௚௬ೕ,೟଼.଻଺ ൅ ܥଶ
௡௢௡௥௘௦_௘௡௘௥௚௬ೕ,೟
଼.଻଺ ሻ    (1)  
 
where: 
                                                 
5 In addition to SAIDI the Italian regulation requires distribution companies to report the average number of 
long interruptions per customer, known by the acronym SAIFI (System Average Interruption Frequency Index), 
as well as the average number of short (shorter than 3 minutes and longer than 1 second) interruptions per 
customer: this index is called MAIFI (Momentary Average Interruption Frequency Index). The average number 
of long (short) interruptions per consumer is calculated as: 
ܵܣܫܨܫ	ሺܯܣܫܨܫሻ ൌ ෍ ௞ܰ
௧ܰ௢௧
ெ
௞ୀଵ
 
where notation is as above. From 2000 to 2007 rewards and penalties were applied to SAIDI only. From 2008 
onwards, rewards and penalties apply to SAIDI as well as to another indicator calculated as the sum of SAIFI 
plus MAIFI (total number of interruptions, long and short ones).  
6 Each of the Enel’s units (Zones) includes two or three districts, typically of different density levels (see also 
Section 4). 
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 DeltaSAIDIj,t (in minutes) is the difference between the target and the actual SAIDI for 
district j in year t; actual and target SAIDIs do not include notified interruptions nor 
events that are not under the responsibility of the distributor (more on this below);  
 C1 and C2 are unitary incentives set by AEEGSI at, respectively, 18 c€/(minute·kW) 
and 36 c€/(minute·kW): they reflect the different willingness to pay for quality of, 
respectively, residential and non-residential customers, as estimated by means of a 
customer survey (AEEGSI, 2007); 
 res_energyj,t and nonres_energyj,t are, respectively, residential and non-residential 
energy consumption per district j and year t (in MWh). 
 
Several remarks are in order. First, AEEGSI sets targets using a formula that implies a 
convergence in performance of all districts with equal population density to the same quality 
level, the so-called national standard, in the medium term (12 years from 2004 for SAIDI). 
This implies that targets are increasingly demanding every year, until the district’s 
performance reaches the set national standard, and that greater quality improvements are 
required by districts reporting lower levels of performance when the medium-term target was 
set. The motivation of this scheme is that the Italian legislation requires distribution tariffs to 
be the same across the entire national territory: the same quality has to be associated to the 
same level of customer expenditure. This also implies that annual rewards received (or 
penalties paid) for each district are collected into a single account. At the end of the year, if 
the account has a surplus, this is equally distributed to consumers by a decrease in the 
distribution tariff. Vice versa, if the account has a deficit, the distribution tariff is increased. 
In this manner, costs (savings) for higher (lower) levels of quality are socialized among 
consumers, while quality-related incentives remain district-specific for the regulated 
companies.7  
Second, the national standard of performance is differentiated per population density so 
that more densely populated districts are expected to provide higher levels of continuity, i.e. a 
higher quality. In other words, regulation accounts for technical differences in urban, 
suburban and rural distribution districts.8  
                                                 
7 In the time span of our analysis, the average household has paid an extra cost due to quality increments of 
about 2 €/year. The cost of continuity regulation was accounted for in the distribution charges of the electricity 
bill. For the average household the latter amounts to around 500 €/year. 
8 Urban networks present, compared to rural networks, shorter feeders, a higher share of underground cables and 
a higher level of redundancy. These structural characteristics favor continuity of supply.  
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Finally, we observe that registered interruption events are classified per cause and origin 
of the fault (e.g., transmission network, Force Majeure, etc.). Although our dataset includes, 
separately, the average duration and number of (long and short) interruptions for all events, in 
this paper we consider only events that, according to the regulatory definition, fall under the 
responsibility of the distributor.9 All other interruptions do not contribute to the regulated part 
of the total SAIDI and do not enter in the calculation of rewards and penalties. For this 
reason, they are excluded also from our empirical analysis. 
 
3. Research design  
The focus of this paper is on the effectiveness of output-based incentive schemes. 
Specifically, we explore whether incentives affect the use of those resources that are most 
likely to affect performance with respect to the regulated outputs.  
Differently from previous work (Jamasb et al., 2012; Coelli et al., 2013), we empirically 
study the relationship between annual monetary incentives and the observed level of 
expenditures. To this end, several issues need to be considered. 
First, because an increase in expenses can be associated both with an increase and with a 
decrease in quality (Jamasb et al., 2012) there is an ambiguity issue. On the one hand, the 
longer and more frequent the interruptions, the higher will be the expenses incurred to repair 
the faults, including personnel related costs (we refer to these as corrective costs). On the 
other hand, expenses (i.e. preventive costs) will increase whenever the firm implements 
specific actions (e.g. more frequent maintenance interventions, structural changes in the 
network, etc.) aimed at improving service quality. The nature of the relationship between 
performance, incentives and expenditures is laid out in Figure 1. As shown in the diagram, 
we expect that physical equipment in year t defines the level of quality in the same year, 
while the effect of new investments in year t will become evident in subsequent years (as 
they are expected to ameliorate future quality). The same holds for maintenance expenditures 
(in that their effect is to be seen in the future). Differently, operational expenditures in year t 
can be influenced by the level of quality in year t, but also influence the level of quality, at 
                                                 
9 In particular, the Italian regulation makes a distinction between interruption events and exceptional 
interruption events or, better, “exceptional time periods”. Since 2004 these events (time periods) are identified 
using a statistical methodology which, originally, identified an extreme region in the daily SAIDI (and SAIFI) 
plane, where such exceptional events (periods) belonged to. The boundaries of this region were originally 
defined for each district using thresholds of means and standard deviations of daily SAIDIs (for details see 
Fumagalli et al., 2009). Such exceptional events (thus including extreme weather) are considered as caused by 
Force Majeure. 
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the same time. Finally, Figure 1 shows that quality levels, calculated at the end of each year, 
determine rewards/penalties for the same year; as such, monetary incentives can enter the 
decision making for expenditures made in the subsequent year. 
This implies that there is also a causality issue. As we set out to explore whether 
incentives influence investment or operational expenditures and, in turn, quality, we need to 
consider that quality does determine the rewards or the penalties, i.e. the incentives granted to 
the firm by the regulator. Hence, the need to test the direction of causality between the 
incentive scheme and the investment or maintenance plans. 
 
 
Figure 1 – Incentives, expenditures and quality 
 
The third issue deals with the organization of distribution, as companies, including Enel, 
often manage several electricity distribution units. Therefore, when only firm-level data are 
available, it is not easy to match the firm (operator)’s attempt to improve service quality in a 
specific unit with the performance of the single distribution unit. The peculiar nature of our  
micro data allows us to cope with this problem in that we have access to both accounting data 
and physical characteristics of the capital endowment of all distribution units (Zone) of the 
operator, i.e. Enel Distribuzione (see Section 4 for a detailed description of the dataset). 
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Hence, we can match these unit-level data with output quality data achieved in each unit. 
Another key feature of this dataset is that each distribution unit accounts for an individual 
and separate managerial decision entity within the company, so it is not inappropriate to view 
them as firms or quasi-firms. 
Finally, the usual measurement problems that arise in calculating the investment rate (i.e. 
the ratio of gross fixed investment to capital stock at replacement value) for standard 
manufacturing firms become even more complicated when applied to a distribution service 
operator. Ideally, we need sensitive accounting data at the distribution unit level, but the 
available accounting monetary values to calculate the investment rate (i.e. the capital 
expenditures and fixed capital stock)) are usually aggregated at firm level (see above). In 
addition, in our empirical analysis, we intend to investigate the relationship between the 
quality-related investments with a particular kind of “output”, i.e. customer minutes lost. 
Again, our micro dataset provides the solution, making available at unit-level the technical 
data on several physical components of the distribution network (e.g., the number of 
automated secondary substations), which can be directly related to higher continuity levels, 
hence to higher quality.  
To deal with the first and second issues, i.e. ambiguity and causality of the impact of 
expenses, our research strategy proceeds in three steps. 
In the first step, we investigate the relationship between the continuity of supply (SAIDI) 
and firms’ capital and non-capital resources. One novelty of our approach is that we proxy 
for capital expenditures with a number of physical characteristics of the distribution network 
(e.g. the number of automated secondary substations) that is generally considered as 
specifically influencing the number of power interruptions and lost minutes. An additional 
advantage of this strategy is that it enables us to connect supply continuity with the actual 
physical assets employed in the distribution unit.  
In the second step, we explore the issue of causality between output-based regulatory 
incentives and the use of resources that are supposed to affect the level of quality (i.e. the 
determinants of continuity of supply analyzed in the first step). To this purpose, we consider 
capital expenditures and operational expenditures, both expressed in monetary values since 
we now relate them to monetary incentives. To establish the direction of causality between 
capital or operational expenditures and regulatory output-based incentives, we apply the 
Granger (1969) and Sims (1972) weak-causality test, which tests whether an increase in 
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incentives is followed by an increase in capital (or operational) expenditures or vice versa.10 
The test allows for three alternative possibilities. First, it may be that past incentives prompt 
the unit’s manager to upgrade the network (i.e. the service), in which case we can say that 
incentives Granger-cause capital (or non-capital) expenditures. Alternatively, it could be that, 
following past increases (or decreases) in capital or operational spending, the unit/firm will 
be granted a reward (or a penalty). In this case, we can say that it is firm’s expenditures 
which Granger-cause incentives. Finally, we may find evidence of circularity, i.e. two-way 
causality, where an increase in (capital or operational) expenditures is followed by an 
increase in incentives, and vice-versa. 
The third step builds on the results of the Granger causality test. Considering that the 
specification of the Granger model just focuses on the dynamic relationship between 
investment and incentives, it can be argued that the relationship may be driven by unobserved 
variables. For example, incentives are definitely either a cash-flow entry (rewards) or a cash-
flow exit (penalties) and investments are related with cash flows. To account for the 
complexity of the investment decision with a more comprehensive approach, we investigate 
the impact of quality-related incentives on investments estimating an accelerator investment 
model that controls for financial and demand factors (Bond et al., 2003).  The objective of 
this analysis is twofold. First, we test whether the dynamic effect of incentives on investment 
survives when we control for other determinants. Second, we test whether penalties and 
rewards present similar or asymmetric effects on the investment rate.  
 
4. The sample and the data  
We built the dataset with the support of the Italian energy regulatory authority, by means of a 
dedicated data collection. It is a comprehensive and balanced panel for 115 distribution units 
(called Zones) that belong to Enel Distribuzione, tracked from 2004 to 2009. Given Enel’s 
market share (86% in 2009) and its presence over the entire national territory, our data 
provides a good representation of the Italian electricity distribution sector.  
The dataset includes unique technical and accounting micro data for each of the 115 units 
(or Zones). Continuity indicator (SAIDI) as well as the amounts annually received in rewards 
(paid in penalties) are available, instead, per district, which are geographical areas smaller 
                                                 
10 See Arellano (2003, Ch. 6) for details regarding the use of Granger causality tests in the context of a panel 
setting. Granger causality tests were recently used to examine several regulatory issues such as tariff rates, 
leverage, investment, intensity of regulation, regulatory independence, etc. (Edwards and Waverman, 2006; 
Bortolotti et al., 2011; Cambini and Rondi, 2012). 
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than Enel’s managerial units, so that each Zone includes two to three (clearly identifiable) 
districts, typically of different density levels. To ensure coherence with technical and 
accounting data, we used the number of low voltage consumers in each district as weights to 
compute for each Zone the continuity indicator as well as quality-related incentives.11  Such 
details about the duration and frequency of interruptions, as well as the amounts of rewards 
received and penalties paid per district are not publicly available data and were directly 
provided by the AEEGSI.  
 
4.1. Data and summary statistics  
By effect of the current regulatory setting (see Section 2), our sample is composed of units 
of observation that are subject to (input-based) incentives to reduce operational costs, but also 
relatively free to choose the desired level of investment. Rewards or penalties associated with 
quality performance increase or decrease the amount of revenues collected by the distribution 
unit, depending on whether it meets (or fails to meet) the regulatory quality targets. 
In the observed time span, both price and quality regulation evolved across two regulatory 
periods (2004-2007 and 2008-2009). Apart from a few, expected adjustments, the general 
regulatory framework remained the same within the entire period of observation.12 
 By looking at service continuity data from 2004 to 2009, we observe a decreasing rate of 
improvement in performance over time. As illustrated in Figure 2 (on the right), the average 
duration of long (longer than 3 min.) interruptions per consumer (actual SAIDI) registered 
the largest improvements in the years 2005 and 2006; after that, only smaller changes in 
quality are visible. A similar trend (Figure 2, on the left) can be observed for the average 
number of long interruptions per consumer (actual SAIFI). While from a technological 
perspective such a trend is to be expected, it also provides an interesting environment for 
exploring the effectiveness of the output-based incentive scheme.  
 
                                                 
11 By combining district-wide data into Zone-wide data, the relation between population density and continuity 
of supply (duration and frequency of interruptions, but also penalties and rewards) becomes considerably less 
precise. 
12 Even so, in our empirical analysis we do test for differences across the two periods. We thank an anonymous 
referee for this suggestion. 
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Figure 2 – Actual SAIDI (right) and SAIFI (left) over the observed period 
 
Our measure of quality performance is the average duration of long interruptions per 
consumer (variable SAIDI).13 We opt for SAIDI because this is the key variable of the 
regulatory incentive scheme for the entire observation period, whereas monetary incentives 
for the number of interruptions (SAIFI) were introduced only in 2008. Accordingly, to 
measure output-based incentives we use a variable which is equal to the amount received in 
rewards or paid in penalties for meeting (failing to meet) SAIDI-related targets (INC) – 
adjusted for inflation by using the Consumer Price Index at 2005 and excluding SAIFI-
related incentives. INC can assume positive and negative values, depending on the quality 
performance in each year. Hence, we also define a REWARD, equal to positive values of INC 
(and zero otherwise) and PENALTY, equal to negative values of INC (and zero otherwise). 
Note that, over the observed period, the occurrence of positive values (rewards) has always 
outnumbered the occurrence of negative values (penalties). 
To investigate potential determinants of the variable SAIDI, we use capital and non-capital 
resources, i.e. fixed capital assets and operational expenditures, as well as control variables to 
account for specific characteristics of the distribution unit.  
The set of physical asset components includes the share of underground cable over total 
network length (UNDER), the number of automated secondary substations per Low Voltage 
(LV) consumer (AUTO_LVcons) and the number of Petersen coils per LV consumer 
(PC_LVcons). The variable UNDER is commonly used in the literature to capture the type of 
the distribution territory (grounding of MV feeders is a standard choice in areas with higher 
population density) as well as the additional burden in terms of capital assets (Kuosmanen, 
                                                 
13 As already mentioned, the variable SAIDI coincides with the regulated part of total SAIDI (e.g., it does not 
include notified interruptions, nor events that originated on the transmission network or that were caused by 
Force Majeure). Also, it was winsorized to exclude an outlier in the first year of observation. 
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2012). UNDER is closely related to continuity of supply, as underground cables are 
associated with a lower probability of fault. The number of automated secondary substations 
and of Petersen coils describes the infrastructural investments made by Enel Distribuzione as 
a response to continuity of supply regulation (Cerretti et al., 2005; Valtorta et al., 2009). Both 
have a positive effect on service quality: the former is supposed to decrease the fault 
selection time while the latter should reduce the number of interruptions.  
Non-capital resources, i.e. operational expenditures, are defined as the sum of costs 
incurred for labor, services, materials and other costs (OPEX) – adjusted for inflation by 
using the Consumer Price Index at 2005. Specifically, the explanatory variable employed 
here (OPEX_LVcons) is constructed as the ratio of OPEX to the number of LV consumers.14  
As a control for specific characteristics of the distribution unit, we employ the percentage 
of non-residential consumption (PERC_NR), i.e. the ratio of LV non-residential consumption 
plus medium voltage consumption over total consumption. This variable accounts for higher 
willingness to pay for quality and for higher revenues per customer and is typically 
associated with better continuity of supply.15 In addition, as shown by Jamasb et al. (2012), 
also weather conditions may affect service quality. We thus include two weather variables 
sourced from the Italian National Statistic Institute (ISTAT): the yearly average amount of 
precipitation (PRECIPITATION)16 and the yearly average minimum temperature (MIN 
TEMP).  
To estimate Granger tests and investment equations the key variables are the investment 
rate, the unit-level control variables, and the regulatory incentives. For the investment rate, 
we start from the accounting values of gross fixed investment (capital expenditures) and 
fixed capital stock at replacement value to calculate the investment (I) to beginning of year 
capital stock (K) ratio (IKt).17 Additional control variables in the empirical investment model 
                                                 
14 Non-capital resources are represented in Ter-Martirosyan and Kwoka (2010) by two variables, operations 
expenses (that cover current firm operations) and maintenance expenses (that involve servicing the 
infrastructure). Our dataset does not allow us to distinguish between the two and we are bound to employ a 
single variable which, inevitably, aggregates preventive as well as corrective costs. 
15 Ter-Martirosyan and Kwoka (2010) employ average income per capita or per capita consumption with the 
same purpose. Other potentially interesting control variables, such as zonal density or the average length of 
feeders per substation report a high correlation with the variable UNDER (respectively, 0.666 and -0.575). 
Hence, they were not included in the analysis. 
16 The publicly available data from ISTAT are provided per administrative province, which closely matches 
Enel’s distribution units. Precipitation is defined as rain, snow, sleet or hail that falls on the ground and is 
measured in mm.  
17 Accounting data typically include only historic cost valuations of fixed assets (capital stock), which usually 
bear little relation to current replacement cost of long-lived fixed capital assets. Hence, we calculate the 
replacement cost of the capital stock using the perpetual inventory formula: pt+1Kt+1 = ptKt(1-)(pt+1/pt) + pt+1It+1, 
where pt is the domestic price index of investment goods in period t sourced by the ISTAT (the National 
Institute  of Statistics), Kt is the fixed capital stock in period t, It is the investment flow in period t, and  is the 
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are the operating cash flow (including depreciations, Πt) and the revenues from sales (St) to 
the beginning of year capital stock ratio (ΠKt and SKt respectively). Regulatory incentives 
enter the investment model as ratios over the beginning of year capital stock (respectively, 
INCKt, REWARDKt, PENALTYKt), in the same way as operational expenditures enter the 
Granger test as ratios over the beginning of year capital stock (OpKt).18  
Finally, several variables are employed as external instruments: zonal density, measured 
by the number of LV consumers over network length (DENSITY), the area covered by forests 
(FOREST) and two dummy variables, one (NORTH) accounting for Zones located in the 
North of Italy (the more industrialized part of the country) and one (COAST) capturing the 
proximity to the sea. 
Table 1 summarizes the variables’ descriptions. Table 2 reports basic descriptive statistics 
and Table 3 reports average economic performance of distribution units in terms of 
investments, operational expenditures and incentives by SAIDI quartiles. The most relevant 
features of the distribution across SAIDI quartiles are not only the obvious negative 
relationship between continuity of supply and incentives, but, more interestingly for us, the 
negative relation between SAIDI, the investment rate and the operational expenses. Table 3 
also highlights that the amount of incentives is not trivial with respect to investment and 
operational expenditures. Rewards represent 22.8% of investment outlays at the top quartile 
(best performers) and only 9.5% at the bottom quartile. Penalties are in practice nonexistent 
among top performers, and mount to almost 2% of the investment outlays for units with the 
lowest quality performance. Finally, with respect to operational expenditures, on average, 
incentives account for 10.1% of operational expenditures in the top quartile and for 2.2% in 
the bottom quartile.  
 
5. Empirical strategy and estimation results  
5.1 Determinants of continuity of supply (step one) 
To study the determinants of continuity of supply, we estimate a fixed-effects model, where 
SAIDI (in minutes) is the dependent variable. Explanatory variables include capital and non-
capital resources, as well as control variables, as described in Section 4 (see Table 2). To 
proxy for capital resources, we consider only physical measures of equipment whose main 
                                                                                                                                                       
depreciation rate. The sector specific depreciation rate for the energy sector (4.4%) is derived from Bureau of 
Economic Analysis estimates reported in “Rates of Depreciation, Service Lives, Declining Balance Rates, and 
Hulten-Wykoff Categories”.   
18 When taken as ratios to the beginning of year capital stock, variables INC, REWARD, PENALTY and OPEX 
are not adjusted for inflation. 
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purpose is to reduce the duration and frequency of regulated interruptions (that are key in the 
calculation of rewards and penalties). Indeed, our dataset does not provide separate monetary 
amounts spent on these assets alone. A well-known technical and accounting problem with 
distribution networks is that while a few quality-specific assets can be clearly identified, most 
structural interventions made by the distributor have multiple purposes. Using the physical 
measure of these (clearly identifiable) quality-specific interventions is particularly useful in 
this first step  Differently, when the focus of the analysis shifts to the monetary value of the 
economic incentives, we switch to using the aggregate value of fixed capital assets and to a 
more standard, accounting-based definition of the investment rate (from Section 5.2 
onwards). For non-capital resources, instead, because, the nature of the data does not allow us 
to focus on quality-specific measures of operational expenses.  As a result, have to rely on 
aggregated accounting values. 
The model takes the following form: 
 
ܵܣܫܦܫ௜,௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܷܰܦܧܴ௜,௧ ൅ ߙଶܣܷܱܶ_ܮܸܿ݋݊ݏ௜,௧ ൅ 	ߙଷܲܥ_ܮܸܿ݋݊ݏ௜,௧ ൅  (2)	
																		൅	ߙସܱܲܧܺ_ܮܸܿ݋݊ݏ௜,௧ ൅ 	ߙହܲܧܴܥ_ܴܰ௜,௧
൅ ߙ଺ܴܲܧܥܫܲܫܶܣܶܫܱ ௜ܰ,௧ ൅ ߙ଻ܯܫܰ_ܶܧܯ ௜ܲ,௧ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߣ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ 
 
where i indicates the distribution unit (Zone) and t the year. The model includes Zone, i, and 
year, t, dummies, and an error term, it. As usual, firm fixed effects account for all time 
invariant observable and unobservable variables.19  
In Table 4, Column (1) and (2) present the results of two simple specifications where we 
include the physical asset components and the operational expenses separately along with the 
unit-specific control variables, while Column (3) reports the results when we include both.  
Overall, the results show that specific, quality-related capital resources positively affect the 
level of service. In particular, the effect is statistically significant for the share of 
underground lines (UNDER) and for the number of automated secondary substations 
(AUTO_LVcons) – both exhibit the expected negative signs. As for the lack of significance of 
PC_LVcons, this might depend on the fact that Petersen coils are installed to reduce the 
                                                 
19 Given the presence of a number of potentially relevant time invariant territorial characteristics, we started the 
empirical analysis by estimating a random effects panel model. However, although the random effects estimates 
are more efficient than fixed effects estimates, in order to be valid, one must ensure that the individual invariant 
component in the error term is not correlated with regressors. To test for the consistency of the random effects 
coefficients we thus employed the Hausman (1978) specification test, but in all specifications the results pointed 
us to use fixed effects estimation. 
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number of interruptions: their effect on their duration is therefore only indirect. Differently, 
in Column (2), we find that operational expenditures (OPEX_LVcons) have a significant and 
positive effect on SAIDI. We interpret this as a prevalence of corrective costs in our 
aggregate variable, i.e. operational costs related to the need to respond to interruptions in the 
service. As for control variables, we find an unexpected positive sign on the share of non-
residential energy consumption (PERC_NR) and on the minimum temperature variable (MIN 
TEMP). However, their estimated coefficients are both statistically insignificant.20 In 
contrast, the second weather variable (PRECIPITATION) has a positive and significant 
coefficient, meaning that more intense precipitation in a Zone has a negative effect on service 
quality. 
To account for potentially (unobserved) factors correlated with changes in regulatory 
period, we interact all independent variables with a dummy (REGII) that takes value 1 for all 
observations in years 2008 and 2009. Results are reported in Column (4). We find that the 
interacted technical variables are all insignificant, meaning that their effect on the dependent 
variable does not differ across the two regulatory periods. The only significant interaction is 
with operational expenses, which appears to have negatively affected service quality in 2008 
and 2009, possibly due to a prevalence of preventive costs (Jamasb et al., 2012). However, 
the sum of the coefficients on linear and interacted operational expenditures terms remains 
positive, confirming our previous results. 
Finally, to test the robustness of our fixed effect estimates, we account for the potential 
endogeneity in this dynamic relationship. We thus include the lagged SAIDI in the regression 
and, we use the Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995) linear generalized 
method of moments (GMM) estimators to deal with the dynamic panel bias and the potential 
endogeneity of other regressors.21  To check the validity of the instrument set, we then 
calculate the two-step Sargan-Hansen statistic under the null hypothesis of joint validity of 
the instruments and report the resulting p-values in Table 4 – Columns (5) and (6).22 
However, the Hansen test does not provide information on the strength, or relevance, of the 
                                                 
20 As a robustness check, we also estimated the above models normalizing the independent variables with 
respect to the power sold (MWh). Our results remain consistent with those in Table 4. For this reason, and to 
save space, we do not report them in the paper, but make them available upon request. 
21 We use the dynamic System-GMM model developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998). This model estimates a system of level and first-differenced equations and uses lags of first-differenced 
variables as instruments for equations in levels and lags of variables in levels as instruments for equations in 
first-differences. For the estimation, we used the xtabond2 Stata module created by Roodman (2006).  
22 The set of instruments includes lags of all the variables in the regression as well as a number of external 
variables that account for the unit-specific environment: the size of the service area in km2 (AREA); the area 
covered by forests, in ha (FOREST), and a dummy variable denoting proximity to the sea (COAST). 
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instruments. Since no well-established criteria is available for evaluating the joint relevance 
of the instrument set (as for the standard two-stage least squares instrumental variable 
method), we follow the two-step procedure recently introduced by Wintoki et al. (2012) and 
calculate the Cragg-Donald Wald statistics, designed to test weak identification of the 
instrument set.23 
Results in Columns (5) and (6) show that most of the variables keep the expected sign 
confirming previous results. UNDER remains negative and significant, PRECIPITATION 
enters with a positive and significant coefficient and the positive coefficient on 
OPEX_LVcons is not far from significance (p value = 0.12). Moreover, the GMM results 
show that the number of Petersen coils (PC_LVcons) has the expected negative and 
significant impact on SAIDI while AUTO_LVcons loses significance. Interestingly, we now 
find that both the share of non-residential energy consumption (PERC_NR) and the minimum 
temperature variable (MIN TEMP) enter significantly and with the expected negative sign in 
Column (5).   
From a research perspective, our results add to previous literature by providing evidence 
on the role of specific, structural interventions on quality levels.24 While grounding of feeders 
is a well-known, quality-enhancing strategy, to the best of our knowledge, the impact of 
network automation and neutral grounding has not been studied previously. We can use our 
GMM estimates to find some quantitative implications. For example, doubling the average 
number of Petersen coils per 104 consumers, from 0.55 to 1.1, would lead to a decrease in 
SAIDI of around 3 minutes. By increasing the percentage of underground lines by one 
percentage point, the number of minutes lost per customer would decrease in the range of 2 
to 4 minutes, depending on the specification; evaluated at the sample mean, this implies that 
SAIDI would decrease on average from 56 to 54-52 minutes per customer. Interestingly, one 
may also note that an increase of 100 mm of PRECIPITATION (from 783 mm to 883 mm at 
the sample mean) would increase SAIDI by about 2 minutes. Finally, the results for non-
                                                 
23 The procedure adapts the two-stage procedure to the GMM-System estimation method and relies on the 
critical values developed by Stock and Yogo (2005) for testing weak identification as used in the 2SLS 
framework. Following Wintoki et al. (2012), and adapting to the system structure of GMM-System, we perform 
the test on the levels of endogenous variables regressed on the instruments in first-differences and obtain the 
first Cragg-Donald (CD) Statistic. Then, we regress the first-differences of the endogenous variables on the 
instruments in levels and obtain the second CD statistic. We finally compare the CD statistics with critical 
values by Stock and Yogo (2005). In Table 6 – Panel A, the values of the CD test are well above the critical 
value of 10, which is the “rule of thumb” critical value suggested for assessing strength of the instruments. See 
also Fremeth and Shavers (2014) for a similar implementation of the test.   
24 Differences in quality performance across Italian distribution units are associated with network structure and 
type of consumers served (Cambini et al., 2014). Since the latter can hardly be modified, it is not surprising that 
quality improvements in Italy are mainly driven by structural interventions (e.g., grounding of feeders and 
network automation).  
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capital resources highlight the corrective role of operational costs, while evidence provided 
by Ter-Martirosyan and Kwoka (2010) supports the (preventive) effect of maintenance 
expenditures. 
We now proceed to examine the direction of causality between output-based incentives 
and firm decisions on investment and operational expenditures. We are not aware of any 
previous work that uses Granger causality tests to this purpose. 
 
5.2 The relationship between capital and non-capital expenditures and incentives (step 
two) 
To test the direction of the relationship between incentives and capital resources we 
perform a Granger test by estimating the following bivariate vector autoregressive VAR(2) 
model for incentives and investment rates: 
 
ܫܭ௜,௧ ൌ ߙ௧ିଵܫܭ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߙ௧ିଶܫܭ௜,௧ିଶ ൅ ߚ௧ିଵூே஼ܫܰܥ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ௧ିଶூே஼ܫܰܥ௜,௧ିଶ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߣ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ூ௄ (3) 
 
ܫܰܥ௜,௧ ൌ ߙ௧ିଵூ௄ ܫܭ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߙ௧ିଶூ௄ ܫܭ௜,௧ିଶ ൅ ߚ௧ିଵܫܰܥ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ௧ିଶܫܰܥ௜,௧ିଶ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߣ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ூே஼   (4) 
 
where IKit is the ratio between gross fixed investment and the beginning of the year capital 
stock at replacement value, INCit is the inflation corrected amount of incentives, and are 
the Zone and year dummies, and  and are the error terms.  
The hypothesis that, conditional on individual and time effects, incentives Granger-cause 
firm investments, but not vice versa, requires that ߚ௧ିଵூே஼ and ߚ௧ିଶூே஼  are positive and jointly 
significant in equation (3), while ߙ௧ିଵூே஼  and ߙ௧ିଶூே஼  are not significant in equation (4). In other 
words, it requires that past incentives (INCi,t-1 and INCi,t-2) contribute significantly to the 
investment rate in regression (3), while past investments (IKi,t-1 and IKi,t-2) do not contribute 
significantly to determine incentives in equation (4). 
In order to control that the total effect of the incentives on investment is positive as well as 
significant, we test the joint significance of the once and twice-lagged coefficients as well as 
their sum and report the p-values of the Wald tests with the regression results in Table 5 – 
Panel A. 
A main concern when estimating a dynamic model as in equations (3) and (4) is that the 
lagged dependent variables are endogenous to the fixed effects in the error term, thus giving 
rise to a dynamic panel bias. As before, we rely on the GMM estimators and we calculate the 
i t
IK
it INCit
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two-step Sargan-Hansen statistic under the null hypothesis of joint validity of the instruments 
and report the resulting p-values in Table 5 – Panel A.25 To ensure that the lagged variables 
are valid instruments, we also present the AR(1) autocorrelation test for the first-differenced 
error terms.26  
The results from estimating equations (3) and (4) are in the first two columns. The results 
in Column (1) show that only the twice-lagged incentive term is statistically significant. 
However, the Wald test indicates that the first and second lags of the incentives in Column 
(1) are jointly significant in explaining the investment rate. Moreover, quite importantly, the 
sum of their coefficients is positive and significant. In contrast, in Column (2), the lagged 
investment terms are insignificant and do not contribute, either individually or jointly, to 
explain the amount of incentives granted to the distribution Zone. The results of the test 
indicate that lagged incentives contribute significantly to determine the investment rate of a 
Zone, and not vice-versa. From a research perspective, our results add to the existing 
literature by establishing a direction in the causality between incentives provided by the 
regulatory authority (in previous periods) and the firm’s investment decision.  
We then turn to the relationship between incentives and operational expenses by using the 
following bivariate Granger causality test: 
 
ܱ݌ܭ௜,௧ ൌ ߙ௧ିଵܱ݌ܭ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߙ௧ିଶܱ݌ܭ௜,௧ିଶ ൅ ߚ௧ିଵூே஼ܫܰܥ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ௧ିଶூே஼ܫܰܥ௜,௧ିଶ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߣ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ை௣௄ 
                              (5) 
 ܫܰܥ௜,௧ ൌ ߙ௧ିଵை௣௄ܱ݌ܭ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߙ௧ିଶை௣௄ܱ݌ܭ௜,௧ିଶ ൅ ߚ௧ିଵܫܰܥ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚ௧ିଶܫܰܥ௜,௧ିଶ ൅ ߤ௜ ൅ ߣ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ூே஼  
                                    (6) 
 
where OpKi,t  is the ratio between the operational expenses in year t and the capital stock in 
year t-1. As before, our hypothesis requires that both  and  are positive and jointly 
significant in equation (5), while ߙ௧ିଵை௣௄ and ߙ௧ିଶை௣௄ are not significant in equation (6).  
                                                 
25 The Sargan-Hansen test is robust, but may be weakened if there are too many instruments with respect to the 
number of observations (Roodman, 2006). Therefore we follow a conservative strategy using no more than 
one/two lags of the instrumenting variables (i.e. the third or fourth lags in our case), to assure that the number of 
instruments is not greater than the number of firms. The rather demanding time structure of the Granger test and 
of the GMM-System estimator is also the reason why the number of observations drops from 690 in Table 4 to 
345 in Table 5 – Panel A (although of course all observations are used in the estimation). 
26 The AR(2) tests of the second-order correlation in the first-differenced residuals could not be calculated by 
STATA due to length of our time series.  However, the purpose of the AR(2) test is to assess the validity of 
instruments lagged two years and in case of invalidity of the instrument, the third lag has to be used. As 
explained in the footnote above, the third lag of the variable is indeed the earliest instrument that we use, hence 
the AR(2) test is not relevant to us.    
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Results in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 – Panel A show that lagged incentives 
contribute significantly to explaining the variable OpK, but the two coefficients  and 
 bear opposite signs. While incentives granted one-year ago appear to increase 
operational expenses, incentives granted two years ago appear to reduce them. Not 
surprisingly, the sum of the two coefficients is not significantly different from zero, as shown 
by the test reported at the bottom of the column. When we look at the reverse relationship, 
i.e. whether past operational expenses significantly determine incentives, we find that the 
coefficients on lagged operational expenses are never significant in the regression where the 
dependent variable is the amount of incentives to the Zone.  
Overall, the results in Columns (3) and (4) do not support any direction in the causality 
between incentives and operational expenses, possibly due to our inability to separate 
preventive from corrective costs within the operational expenses item.27  
To further test the robustness of our analysis, we also run the Granger tests replacing INC 
(incentives) with REWARDS (i.e. positive incentive payments) as the main variable of 
interest. Results are reported in Table 5 – Panel B. The results show that (past) rewards do 
affect investment rate, but not vice versa. Once again, the evidence when we use operational 
expenses does not allow us to establish the direction of the causality between rewards and 
operational expenditures. Overall, this further evidence is consistent with the results in Table 
5-Panel A.  
 
5.3 The impact of quality-related incentives and the asymmetric effect of penalties and 
rewards (step three) 
In this section, we expand the scope of the analysis of the relationship between investment 
and incentives. We first test if past incentives still affect investment after controlling for other 
potential determinants and we then investigate whether penalties and rewards have similar or 
asymmetric effects on investment.  
We conjecture that rewards and penalties received act as a signal (more or less effective) 
of the adequacy of the capital expenditure decisions made by the firm to control continuity 
of supply: a reward indicates that firm decisions were more than adequate (above the 
regulatory expectations) and vice versa. Hence, we expect penalties do stimulate investments: 
                                                 
27 We recall that previous literature has found (weak) evidence that quality standards (not necessarily output-
based incentives) result in greater maintenance expenditures (Ter-Martisoryan and Kwoka, 2010). We must 
postpone further investigation until this distinction in the data becomes available. 
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even if the firm (on a rational basis) had not spent on quality in the previous period, it should 
be more prone to invest after receiving a penalty. As for rewards, we have equal expectations 
for both types of responses. On the one hand, a premium might reinforce the firm’s 
willingness to take additional measures to reduce outages. On the other hand, it may also 
induce the firm simply to maintain the same level of quality performance. 
For a basic empirical model, we rely on the micro econometric literature on company 
investment. We include the lagged investment ratio to account for capital stock adjustment, 
and demand growth, measured by the change in sales to capital stock ratio [(SKt)], to 
account for the accelerator effect and for future investment opportunities. 28 Moreover, to 
control for financing constraints due to imperfect capital markets and asymmetric 
information, we add the operating cash flow to capital stock ratio (ΠKt).29   
We augment this model by adding the monetary incentives, normalized with respect to 
beginning of the year capital stock at replacement value. We start with the aggregate 
incentive variable (INCKt), which can take positive or negative values, then we test the effect 
of rewards (REWARDKt) and finally we turn to penalties (PENALTYKt), all of which entered 
separately in the investment specification. The baseline specification is the following: 
 
IKi,t =0 + 1 IKi,t-1 + 2 SKi,t + 3 ΠKi,t +4 INCKi,t-1 + t + i + it  (7) 
 
where INCKi,t-1 is alternatively replaced by REWARDKi,t-1, PENALTYKi,t-1; t and i are the 
Zone and year dummies, while it is the error term. 
To estimate the dynamic investment model in equation (7) with panel data, we rely on the 
linear generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator.30  We report the two-step Sargan-
Hansen statistic under the null hypothesis of joint validity of the instruments, the difference 
in Hansen test of exogeneity (which compares full and restricted models to assess the 
orthogonality of the instruments)  and the AR(1) and AR(2) autocorrelation tests for the first-
differenced error terms. Moreover, we calculate the Cragg-Donald Wald statistics, designed 
to test weak identification of the instrument set.  
                                                 
28 Recall that revenues from tariffs (i.e. sales) also cover quality-related costs for the provision of target SAIDI.  
29 See, for example, Hubbard (1998) for a comprehensive survey of company investment models estimated with 
panel data, Fazzari et al. (1988) for a seminal contribution, Lyon and Mayo (2005) for an application to the US 
electric utility industry and Cambini and Rondi (2010) for an application to EU energy companies. 
30 The set of instruments includes lags of investment, sales, cash flow and incentives (or rewards or penalties) to 
capital stock ratios as well as a number of external variables that account for the unit-specific environment: the 
percentage of the non residential energy consumption (PERC_NR); zonal density, measured by the number of 
LV consumers over network length (DENSITY); the area covered by forests, in ha (FOREST), and a dummy 
variable indicating Zones in the North of the country (NORTH). 
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We report the results in Table 6 – Panel A. In Column (1) we examine the effect of the 
aggregate incentive variable and in Columns (2) and (3) we test the separate effect of rewards 
and penalties.31  In all Columns, both demand growth and the cash-flow to capital ratio enter 
with a positive and significant coefficient, suggesting that demand and financial factors do 
matter for the investment decisions. Moreover, the lagged investment term is positive and not 
too far from significance in most specifications. Having established that the usual control 
variables work as expected, we turn to the effect of the output-based incentive scheme, which 
is the focus of the paper. 
In Column (1), the effect of the aggregate measure of monetary incentives (INCt/Kt-1) is 
positive, but the coefficient is insignificant, possibly because the effects of rewards and 
penalties cancel each other out in this specification, i.e. after controlling for other 
determinants of investment. To pin down the effect of the output-based incentives policy we 
thus follow an alternative route and test, separately, the role of reward and penalties. If both 
types of incentives are “successful” in fostering capital expenditures, we should find that 
REWARDK carries a positive sign, while PENALTYK should enter with a negative 
coefficient. This is what we find when we look at Columns (2) and (3) in Table 6 – Panel A. 
However, while the negative coefficient on PENALTYK is statistically significant (with a p-
value of 0.022), the coefficient on REWARDK is positive but insignificant. This indicates that 
the firm is more sensitive to negative, than to positive incentives.  
These findings reveal an asymmetric effect of rewards and penalties, as rewards do not 
seem to affect significantly the firm’s investment decision while penalties apparently do. To 
throw some light on this result, in Table 6 – Panel B we divide the sample in subgroups 
according to different levels of quality performance, i.e. by SAIDI quartiles, and then test 
whether rewards and penalties present a differentiated impact whenever Zones report 
different quality performance.32 In Column (1), we analyze the effect of regulatory incentives 
in Zones with the SAIDI indicator below 32 minutes (top quartile in terms of service quality). 
Results show that rewards do matter in top quality Zones, affecting the investment rate. 
When we turn to Zones in the range of intermediate quality performance (second and third 
quartiles) we find that neither rewards (Column 2) nor penalties (Column 3) display a 
significant effect on investment. Finally, when we look at the sub-sample of units with the 
lowest quality of service (above 73.9 minutes), we find that the coefficient on PENALTYK is 
                                                 
31 We also checked the fixed effect results from the static version of the investment model and we found that 
they hold. Results are available on requests.  
32 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting us this further analysis. 
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negative and significant, which, recalling that the variable is entered with a negative sign, 
means that penalties have a positive effect on the investment rate. If we translate the 
estimated coefficients into quantitative effects, we find that a 1 percentage point increase in 
the reward to capital stock ratio for high performing units would lead to a 0.4% increase in 
the investment rate; evaluated at the sample mean, this implies an increase from 6.6% to 7%. 
Turning to penalties, and taking into account that they are on average quite lower than 
rewards (see Tables 2 and 3), we find that by doubling the mean PENALTYK to less 
performing units from 0.35% to 0.70%, the investment rate would increase by 0.5 percentage 
points; that is, evaluated at the mean, from 5.8% to 6.2% (not far from the investment rate of 
the best performing units).  
Not only this is a novel result from a research perspective, but it also conveys interesting 
policy insights into output-based regulation.33 We find that the Italian incumbent distributor 
does respond to the signal provided by penalties received the year before by deploying capital 
resources to improve service quality. In other words, penalties paid in the past are effective in 
inducing the firm to exert effort aimed at improving quality, and especially so if it operates in 
area with a low quality performance. As for rewards, we interpret the lack of statistical 
significance in the majority of areas as an indication that ENEL Distribuzione views positive 
monetary incentives as a signal that their level of output is adequate. Accordingly, rewards 
granted the year before are less likely to lead the firm to invest further (i.e. to exercise an 
additional effort). 
 
 
6. Conclusions and policy implications 
We use detailed micro data on service quality (duration of service interruptions), monetary 
incentives and physical assets for the largest Italian electricity distributor to shed some light 
on the relation between quality-based incentives and the incumbent’s decisions about capital 
and operational expenditures in order to meet given regulatory targets. This analysis is 
relevant, not only because it aims at throwing some light on the practical implementation of 
output-based regulatory mechanisms, but also because regulators are currently expanding the 
set of regulatory outputs that are subject to incentive mechanisms.  
                                                 
33 Using a different empirical approach, Poudineh and Jamasb (2015) find that the cost of energy-not-supplied 
seems relevant in explaining the investment behavior of Norwegian electricity distribution companies. 
However, their result suggests that investments have mainly been of a corrective nature rather than a preventive 
one (they are a response to outages in the same time period). 
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We begin by providing empirical evidence that investments in specific quality-related 
physical assets are effective in enhancing the level of service quality. This adds to previous 
literature that focused on the effect of operational expenditures. Then, we concentrate on the 
direction of the causality in the relationship between incentives to quality and the use of  
capital and non-capital resources. We find that incentives Granger-cause capital expenditures 
(and not vice-versa). Finally, we proceed to verify whether incentives continue to affect 
firms’ decision to invest, after we account for other potential determinants of the investment 
rate. We do so also by considering the effect on investment of positive and negative 
incentives, i.e. reward and penalties, separately. Our results show that (paid) penalties are 
more effective than rewards in prompting the incumbent to invest capital resources to 
improve their performance. When we divide the sample in subgroups of zones with different 
levels of service quality, we find that penalties have a significant and positive effect on the 
investment rate in zones with low quality performance but not where the service quality is 
intermediate quality. As for rewards, we find that they positively and significantly affect 
investment decisions in zones that report top service quality performance, but not within 
distribution units with intermediate quality.  The lack of significance of both rewards and 
penalties in intermediate quality areas suggests that monetary incentives do not provide any 
relevant signal to the regulated firm and that rewards are viewed as a premium for achieving 
a desirable level of performance, not as a stimulus to exert an additional effort. Overall, the 
evidence of an asymmetric role of quality-related incentives suggests that penalties and 
rewards should separately analyzed when assessing the effectiveness of an output-based 
regulatory policy.  
Our results question the usefulness of maintaining a two-side (positive and negative) 
incentive scheme over the entire range of output levels, as well as the use of both types of 
incentives over a relatively wide output range, where they seem to be not effective (or no 
longer effective). These considerations appear relevant in light of the complex 
implementation of these incentive schemes and the associated costs incurred in practice by 
the regulatory authority. 
On the policy ground, our results suggest that regulators might consider whether to assign 
incentives only to top or bottom quality units or, given the length of the investment process, 
perhaps assign them less frequently, i.e. not every year, but eventually only once in every 
regulatory period. Such policy would preserve the incentive mechanism and at the same time, 
it would reduce the occurrence of incentive assignments and, possibly, the cost of quality 
regulation.   
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Table 1. Variables’ descriptions 
Variable name Label Description 
SAIDI  System Average Interruption Duration Index 
Average duration of long, unplanned interruptions per 
customer (in minutes). 
INC Regulatory incentives 
Amounts received in rewards or paid in penalties (the 
variable assume either a positive or a negative sign). 
In constant euros (base 2005). 
REWARD Rewards Equal to the variable INC if this is positive (and zero otherwise). In constant euros (base 2005). 
PENALTY Penalties  Equal to the variable INC if this is negative (and zero otherwise). In constant euros (base 2005). 
UNDER Percentage of underground cable Ratio of underground cable length over total network length.  
AUTO_LVcons 
Number of automated secondary 
substations per Low Voltage (LV) 
consumer 
Ratio of the number of automated secondary 
substations over the number of LV consumers. 
PC_LVcons Number of Petersen coils per LV consumer 
Ratio of the number of Petersen coils over the number 
of LV consumers.  
PERC_NR Percentage of non-residential energy consumption 
Ratio of LV non-residential energy consumption plus 
Medium Voltage (MV) energy consumption to total 
energy consumption. 
OPEX Operational expenditures Sum of costs incurred for labor, services, materials and other costs. In constant euros (base 2005). 
OPEX_LVcons Operational expenditures per LV consumer 
Ratio of operational expenditures to the number of 
LV consumers. In constant euros (base 2005). 
PRECIPITATION Precipitation  Yearly average amount of rain, snow, sleet, or hail that falls to the ground (in mm) 
MIN TEMP Minimum temperature  Yearly average minimum temperature (in Celsius degrees) 
IK Investment rate Ratio of investments (I in t) to the beginning of year capital stock, at replacement value (K in t-1). 
ΠK Operating cash flow to capital stock ratio 
Ratio of operating cash flow (Π in t) to the beginning 
of year capital stock, at replacement value (K in t-1). 
SK Sales to capital stock ratio Ratio of sales (S in t) to the beginning of year capital stock, at replacement value (K in t-1). 
OpK Operational expenditures to capital stock ratio 
Ratio of operational expenditures (OPEX in t) to the 
beginning of year capital stock, at replacement value 
(K in t-1). 
INCK Incentives to capital stock ratio  
Ratio of incentives (INC – not adjusted for inflation – 
in year t) to the beginning of year capital stock, at 
replacement value (K in year t-1). 
REWARDK Rewards to capital stock ratio 
Ratio of rewards (REWARD – not adjusted for 
inflation – in year t) in year t t to the beginning of 
year capital stock, at replacement value (K in year t-
1). 
PENALTYK Penalties to capital stock ratio 
Ratio of penalties (PENALTY – not adjusted for 
inflation – in year t) to the beginning of year capital 
stock, at replacement value (K in year t-1). 
COAST Proximity to the sea Dummy variable that takes the value 1 when a Zone is close to the sea 
NORTH North of Italy Dummy variable that takes the value 1 when a Zone is located in the North of the country 
AREA Dimension of the service area Total area covered (in km2)  
DENSITY Consumer density  Ratio of number of LV consumer to network length 
FOREST Area covered by forest Hectares of land covered by forest 
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Table 2 – Summary statistics 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N. Obs. 
SAIDI (minutes) 56.34 31.56 10.42 194.28 690 
INC (M€) 0.87 1.13 -3.07 8.77 690 
REWARD (M€) 0.90 1.09 0.00 8.77 690 
PENALTY (M€) 0.03 0.18 0.00 3.07 690 
UNDER (%) 0.71 0.12 0.46 0.97 690 
AUTO_LVcons  (n./102 consumers) 2.80 0.076 0.123 0.849 690 
PC_LVcons (n./104 consumers) 0.549 0.379 0.00 2.34 690 
PERC_NR (%) 0.72 0.08 0.51 0.85 690 
OPEX (M€) 17.19 8.52 4.13 50.48 690 
OPEX_LVcons (€/consumer) 65.04 10.87 43.20 112.52 690 
PRECIPITATION (mm) 782.90 173.51 406 1378.7 690 
MIN TEMP (°C) 8.81 2.86 -1.5 15.2 690 
IK  0.06 0.02 0.00 0.26 575 
ΠK  0.24 0.10 0.07 0.96 575 
SK  0.34 0.11 0.14 1.15 575 
OpK  0.14 0.03 0.06 0.40 690 
INCK 0.009 0.010 -0.012 0.087 575 
REWARDK  0.009 0.010 0.00 0.087 575 
PENALITYK  0.0003 0.0013 0.00 0.012 575 
AREA (km2) 2480.22 1445.81 130.92 7274.35 690 
COAST 0.54 0.50 0 1 690 
NORTH 0.42 0.49 0 1 690 
DENSITY (consumers/km) 28.71 11.68 13.07 82.94 690 
FOREST (ha) 106,310 98,638 2,519 422,772 690 
 
 
Table 3 – Average level of the main economic variables 
by service quality defined as SAIDI quartiles 
Service Quality  
(SAIDI, minutes) 
Investment/ 
Capital Stock 
(IK) 
Operation Exp./ 
Cap. Stock 
(OpK) 
Incentives/ 
Cap. Stock 
(INCK) 
Incentives/ 
Op.Ex/ 
(%) 
Rewards/ 
Investment 
(%) 
Penalties/ 
Investment 
(%) 
SAIDI < 32 0.066 0.149 0.015 10.1 22.8 0.002 
32  SAIDI < 47.7 0.062 0.140 0.010 7.1 18.3 0.074 
47.7  SAIDI < 73.9 0.058 0.143 0.005 3.5 12.8 0.79 
SAIDI  73.9 0.058 0.138 0.003 2.2 9.5 1.92 
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Table 4. Technical and economic determinants of continuity of supply (SAIDI) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep. Variable: SAIDI Physical Equipment Operational expenditures 
Physical Equipment 
and Operational 
expenditures 
Controlling for 
regulatory periods 
Physical 
Equipment 
Physical Equipment 
and Operational 
expenditures 
 Fixed Effects GMM 
UNDER -426.91** - -334.46* -268.24 -469.00*** -260.52** 
 (211.86) - (195.97) (235.99) (125.75) (132.81) 
AUTO_LVcons -51.83** - -52.91** -57.54** -10.82 -36.56 
 (4.21) - (22.07) (26.47) (19.19) (26.02) 
PC_LVcons -3.584 - -1.854 -1.223 -6.274* -6.687** 
 (4.21) - (4.078) (3.913) (3.464) (3.363) 
OPEX_LVcons - 1.162*** 1.056*** 1.041*** - 0.451 
 - (0.324) (0.309) (0.314) - (0.290) 
PERC_NR 118.62 144.08 146.02 186.11 -129.31*** -109.93*** 
 (131.41) (125.39) (126.12) (137.43) (22.74) (22.74) 
PRECIPITATION 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
MIN TEMP 2.486 1.775 1.635 2.001 -1.235** -0.824 
 (2.16) (1.960) (2.026) (2.069) (0.62) (0.532) 
SAIDIt-1 - - - - 0.453*** 0.478*** 
 - - - - (0.065) (0.059) 
UNDER*REGII - - - -0.98 - - 
 - - - (17.00) - - 
AUTO_LVcons*REGII - - - 15.00 - - 
 - - - (21.72) - - 
PC_LVcons*REGII - - - -1.982 - - 
 - - - (3.870) - - 
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OPEX_LVcons*REGII - - - -0.583** - - 
 - - - (0.265) - - 
Constant 256.62 -156.74 99.32 23.79 152.78*** 98.64*** 
 (182.04) (94.12) (183.55) (219.50) (25.61) (35.52) 
Unit dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.358 0.368 0.383 0.392 - - 
AR(1) - - - - 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) - - - - 0.332 0.418 
Sargan-Hansen Test (p value) - - - - 0.202 0.171 
Cragg-Donald weak identification test 
statistic (levels) - 
- - - 11.3 7.31 
Cragg-Donald weak identification test 
statistic (first-diff) - 
- - - 33.29 26.47 
Observations 690 690 690 690 575 575 
Number of units 115 115 115 115 115 115 
 
All variables are defined in Table 1. Robust standard errors in parentheses: 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 5 – Panel A. Granger Tests: relationship between investment and incentives and between operational expenditures  and incentives 
 
Investment and Incentives Operational expenditures and Incentives 
Dep. Variable: IK Dep. Variable: INC Dep. Variable: OpK Dep. Variable: INC 
        
 -0.324  -38.178  0.819***  13.768 
 (0.418)  (37.644)  (0.301)  (13.318) 
 -0.160*  -8.880  0.121***  5.230 
 (0.086)  (8.290)  (0.035)  (5.843) 
 -0.001  0.202  0.002*  0.259** 
 (0.002)  (0.135)  (0.001)  (0.107) 
 0.005**  0.348  -0.003***  0.105 
 (0.002)  (0.221)  (0.001)  (0.071) 
Constant 0.082** Constant 3.099 Constant 0.025 Constant -2.465 
 (0.035)  (3.021)  (0.043)  (2.378) 
        
P-value test on  
H0: = =0 
 
0.038 
P-value test on  
H0: = =0 
 
0.558 
P-value test on  
H0 = =0 
 
0.007 
P-value test on  
H0: = = 0 
 
0.582 
P-value test on  
H0: + = 0 
 
0.079 
P-value test on  
H0: + = 0 
 
0.299 
P-value test on  
H0: + =0 
 
0.597 
P-value test on  
H0: + = 0 
 
0.301 
Obs. [Nr. Unit] 345 [115] Obs. [Nr. Unit] 345 [115] Obs. [Nr. Unit] 345 [115] Obs. [Nr. Unit] 345 [115] 
Hansen test 0.648 Hansen test 0.293 Hansen test 0.513 Hansen test 0.027 
AR1 0.910 AR1 0.218 AR1 0.100 AR1 0.014 
All variables are defined in Table 1. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 5 – Panel B. Granger Tests: relationship between investment and rewards and between operational expenditures and rewards 
 
Investment and Rewards Operational expenditures and Rewards 
Dep. Variable: IK Dep. Variable: REWARD Dep. Variable: OpK Dep. Variable: REWARD 
        
 -0.204  -27.167  0.655*  30.819 
 (0.407)  (33.877)  (0.379)  (26.279) 
 -0.187*  -8.177  0.089***  6.705 
 (0.112)  (9.495)  (0.028)  (8.150) 
 -0.002  0.294**  0.002  0.331** 
 (0.003)  (0.128)  (0.002)  (0.146) 
 0.007**  0.311  -0.002**  0.012 
 (0.003)  (0.237)  (0.001)  (0.088) 
Constant 0.067** Constant 2.240 Constant 0.047 Constant -4.601 
 (0.033)  (2.699)  (0.049)  (4.350) 
        
P-value test on  
H0: = =0 
 
0.020 
P-value test on  
H0: = =0 
 
0.668 
P-value test on  
H0 = =0 
 
0.096 
P-value test on  
H0: = = 0
 
0.448 
P-value test on  
H0: + = 0 
 
0.027 
P-value test on  
H0: + = 0 
 
0.407 
P-value test on  
H0: + =0 
 
0.881 
P-value test on  
H0: + = 0
 
0.268 
Obs. [Nr. Unit] 286 [112] Obs. [Nr. Unit] 286 [112] Obs. [Nr. Unit] 286 [112] Obs. [Nr. Unit] 286 [112] 
Hansen test 0.643 Hansen test 0.158 Hansen test 0.496 Hansen test 0.125 
AR1 0.720 AR1 0.122 AR1 0.144 AR1 0.033 
All variables are defined in Table 1. Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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INC
t 2 2t INCt 2 2t
INC
t 1 INCt 2 IKt 1 IKt 2 INCt 1 INCt 2 OpKt 1 OpKt 2
INC
t 1 INCt 2 IKt 1 IKt 2 INCt 1 INCt 2 OpKt 1 OpKt 2
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Table 6 – Panel A:  Investment analysis - GMM estimations 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dep. Variable: IKi,t  
Incentives 
 
Rewards 
 
Penalties 
    
IKi,t-1 0.107 0.105 0.118 
 (0.089) (0.089) (0.085) 
SKi,t 0.133*** 0.133*** 0.134*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) 
ΠKi,t 0.066*** 0.068*** 0.081*** 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.015) 
INCKi,t-1 0.241 - - 
 (0.196) - - 
REWARDKi,t-1 - 0.233 - 
 - (0.207) - 
PENALTYKi,t-1 - - -1.552** 
 - - (0.679) 
Constant 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.030*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Unit dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
AR1 (p-value) 0.006 0.006 0.005 
AR2 (p-value) 0.556 0.559 0.735 
Hansen test of over-identification (p-value) 0.454 0.477 0.673 
Diff-in-Hansen test of exogeneity (p-value) 0.900 0.802 0.922 
Number of Instruments 25 25 27 
Cragg-Donald weak identification test statistic (levels) 31.49 31.19 40.88 
Cragg-Donald weak identification test statistic (first-
diff) 
67.50 61.36 75.89 
Observations 460 460 460 
Number of units 115 115 115 
All variables are defined in Table 1. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
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Table 6 – Panel B:  Investment analysis - GMM estimations with Subsamples 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Variable: IKi,t High performance 
units 
(SAIDI   32) 
I Quartile 
Average  
performance Units  
(32 < SAIDI < 73.9) 
 
II-III Quartile 
Average  
performance Units  
(32 < SAIDI < 73.9) 
 
II-III Quartile 
Low  
performance Units 
(SAIDI  73.9) 
IV Quartile 
IKi,t-1 0.099 0.173 0.112 0.342 
 (0.072) (0.199) (0.152) (0.276) 
SKi,t 0.160*** 0.169*** 0.168** 0.585** 
 (0.021) (0.066) (0.085) (0.245) 
ΠKi,t 0.074** 0.186** 0.189*** 0.074 
 (0.030) (0.080) (0.071) (0.077) 
REWARDKi,t-1 0.417** -0.226 - - 
 (0.212) (0.185) - - 
PENALTYKi,t-1 - - -0.704 -1.459* 
 - - (1.015) (0.767) 
Constant 0.030*** 0.003 0.006 0.017 
 (0.008) (0.016) (0.017) (0.026) 
Unit dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR1 (p-value) 0.009 0.054 0.047 0.053 
AR2 (p-value) 0.744 0.907 0.832 0.780 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.155 0.365 0.414 0.107 
Diff-in-Hansen test of exogeneity (p-
value) 
0.100 0.115 0.226 0.355 
Number of Instruments 25 21 21 21 
Observations 138 238 236 86 
Number of units 44 83 83 36 
All variables are defined in Table 1. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
